Pegasus Spyware Reached an MEP Investigating Pegasus

Pegasus Spyware Reached an MEP Investigating Pegasus (1)

Pegasus spyware, a surveillance tool developed by NSO Group, has been found on the phone of a member of the European Parliament committee set up to investigate it. Citizen Lab, a research group at the University of Toronto, published the forensic report on 3 July 2026. It says the device of Stelios Kouloglou, a Greek journalist and former MEP, was infected in October 2022 and again in March 2023.

Table of contents
  1. The investigator’s phone was the target
  2. Nobody has named the customer
  3. Three years of recommendations, no EU-wide answer
  4. The sellers sit inside the EU
  5. The case for caution, taken seriously
  6. Parliament can start with its own phones

Kouloglou sat on the inquiry as a substitute member while it collected evidence on spyware abuse across Europe. Citizen Lab warns that the infection could have exposed confidential exchanges inside the committee. The case tests a basic assumption of oversight: that the people who investigate spyware are not themselves its targets.

The investigator’s phone was the target

Citizen Lab assesses with high confidence that the phone was infected on or around 21 October 2022. It assesses the method to be an exploit called PWNYOURHOME, a zero-click attack that works without any action by the victim. Further Pegasus activity on 6 and 7 March 2023 is likely linked to the same exploit. The phone ran iOS 15.5 on both dates.

The infections fall inside the inquiry’s working period, which ran from March 2022 to July 2023. Hearings took place on 26 and 27 October 2022, days after the first infection. Kouloglou took part in the committee’s visit to Greece and Cyprus in early November 2022, and the first draft report was delivered on 8 November.

In March 2023 he was in Brussels while the committee’s rapporteur was on a mission in Greece. The committee adopted its report on 8 May 2023, and Parliament backed the recommendations on 15 June. Apple sent threat notifications to the phone between March 2023 and April 2024, and Kouloglou does not recall them, the report says.

The report is careful about what it cannot show. On data theft it holds back: the spyware could have had access to the phone’s contents or likely captured information, in its words. Whether other committee members or staff were infected is unknown. Citizen Lab calls the case “significant and troubling”.

The timing gives the case weight beyond the technical findings. The first infection came days before the October 2022 hearings and about two weeks before the Greece and Cyprus visit. The second came roughly two months before the committee adopted its report. A device inside the committee was infected at stages when evidence, travel plans and draft text were all in circulation.

Nobody has named the customer

Citizen Lab attributes the infections to NSO Group’s Pegasus with high confidence, and the customer who ran the operation stays unnamed. The report found no indications that the Greek government is responsible and notes that there are no reports of Greece being an NSO customer. The missing name is the heart of the matter.

The report does draw one thread. Citizen Lab believes the same operator targeted Kouloglou in 2022 and seven Russian- and Belarusian-speaking journalists and activists in Europe, whose cases it documented with Access Now in 2024. The link is an Apple account address that appears in both sets of cases. It cannot say whether the 2023 infection belongs to the same operator.

Read also: Europe’s Surveillance Rules Are Being Written Around the Exceptions

That 2024 investigation found people in Riga, Warsaw and Vilnius who had been targeted between August 2020 and January 2023, five of them infected. Overlapping Apple accounts on five devices suggested, but did not prove, one actor behind those attacks. Citizen Lab named no operator then either.

The 2026 report adds a geographic clue. The infections appear to have occurred in at least two EU jurisdictions, Greece and Belgium. Citizen Lab reads that as a sign of a customer licensed to operate in several EU countries and labels this an inference. The record describes an operator active inside the Union whose targets include journalists in exile and a parliamentary investigator. It leaves the name blank.

The record spans a long period. The 2024 cases ran from August 2020 to January 2023, and the Kouloglou infections began in October 2022. If one operator is behind them, as the shared Apple account address suggests for the 2022 cases, it was active for more than two years across several EU capitals and Brussels.

Three years of recommendations, no EU-wide answer

Parliament’s inquiry ended with a set of recommendations adopted on 15 June 2023. Amnesty International calls them clear and detailed and says it is still waiting for implementation. A joint statement from civil society groups, including EDRi, says the EU has failed to deliver “a meaningful, EU-wide response” nearly three years later.

The complaint is old. In November 2023 Parliament voted 425 to 108, with 23 abstentions, for a resolution regretting that the Commission had presented no plan to respond to the threats spyware poses to people and democracy. MEPs asked it to assess by the end of that month whether Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Spain met the conditions for continued use of spyware.

The same resolution recorded how patchy national follow-up was. Two Greek intelligence officials faced criminal charges, and the Greek authority for communications privacy saw its investigation moved to another prosecutor. A Polish national inquiry committee concluded that people had been targeted with spyware for political reasons.

Spain’s inquiry was provisionally dismissed because of a lack of cooperation from Israeli authorities. Those were the national answers three years ago. The Commission’s answer, MEPs said then, was no legislative follow-up at all.

The 2026 demands echo the 2023 ones. The coalition asks Parliament’s technology directorate (DG ITEC) for an independent investigation into the Kouloglou infection. It wants the Commission to answer the recommendations in public and set out a roadmap. And it wants member states to guarantee victims access to evidence, independent investigations and notification.

Delay has a visible cost in the dates. The inquiry’s recommendations date from June 2023. Apple’s notifications to Kouloglou’s phone ran from March 2023 to April 2024, so warnings existed long before the public report of July 2026.

The sellers sit inside the EU

EU member states host many companies that make surveillance technology, Human Rights Watch says in a 54-page report published in May 2026. It examined the EU’s Dual-Use Regulation, adopted in 2021, which covers commercial surveillance tools. Its researchers sent freedom of information requests to all 27 member states and received data from nearly half of them.

The data shows licences for exports to authorities with well-documented records of using such tools against critics. Human Rights Watch’s examples include Bulgaria to Azerbaijan in 2022, covering intrusion software, telecommunication interception systems, or both, and Poland to Rwanda in 2023, covering interception systems.

Read also: Chat Control Is Mass Surveillance in Disguise

The Commission has said member states are solely responsible for licensing decisions on dual-use exports. Human Rights Watch argues that a 2024 Commission recommendation on reporting hides which technology went to which destination, and that the Commission justified it by pointing to commercial confidentiality, since only a limited number of companies export such items.

A formal evaluation of the regulation is due to begin later in 2026. The civil society coalition wants it to draw on the inquiry’s findings, include a fundamental rights impact assessment and involve civil society.

The coalition also points to a 2025 report that the European Investment Fund financed the spyware company Paragon, and demands that EU funds stop reaching such firms. No amounts are given, and the claim is the signatories’ own.

The data request also shows how little is visible. Human Rights Watch wrote to all 27 states and heard back from nearly half, which leaves the licensing picture for the rest dark. Exports by the other states, and the end users they reached, cannot be assessed from this record.

The case for caution, taken seriously

The defenders of the current order have real points. Citizen Lab makes no claim that an EU government hacked Parliament and found no sign that Greece did. Whether anything was taken is beyond its reach, since the attackers could have had access. And the Commission treats licensing as the responsibility of national authorities.

The report’s own gaps carry the counterweight. The operator is unidentified, the status of other members’ devices is unknown, and no one can say what was read. Without duties to notify victims and give them access to evidence, a person in Kouloglou’s position has no route to an answer. A member of Parliament has more support than most. A journalist in exile in Riga or Warsaw has less.

Parliament can start with its own phones

Citizen Lab’s recommendations are concrete. Members and staff should seek spyware screening through DG ITEC and switch on Lockdown Mode or an equivalent protection. Parliament should investigate attacks on MEPs, commission annual threat reports and widen screening.

The Commission, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and national parliaments are asked to screen their own members and staff. Technology companies get a task too: make threat notifications clear enough that recipients notice and act on them.

The inquiry ran from March 2022 to July 2023, and one of its members was infected during it. Citizen Lab could not identify the operator, could not confirm what was taken, and does not know whether anyone else on the committee was reached. More than three years after the recommendations, those remain the open questions in the public record.

Part of our guide to Chat Control: Chat Control: Who Gets to Read Your Messages

BASIS OF ANALYSIS

Basis of analysis. The analysis rests on six sources. Two are the Citizen Lab forensic reports, one is a Parliament press release and one is a Human Rights Watch report summary. The statements from Amnesty International and the civil society coalition are advocacy positions and are used as such. The PEGA recommendations and the Commission’s own responses were not examined directly, and no source establishes who operated the spyware.

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