In the first quarter of 2026, Russia’s oil and gas revenue fell about 45 percent from a year earlier. In April its oil export earnings reached $21.5 billion, roughly double the $10.4 billion a month of January and February. Ministers who call the Russia sanctions a success quote the first number. Commentators who call them a failure quote the second. Both are selling a certainty the data does not hold.
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Russia sanctions, tested on one measure
The first-quarter fall is real. Russian officials listed three causes: the new oil sanctions, a strong rouble and a cooling economy. The Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) ties the oil and gas shortfall to US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia’s two largest oil producers.
Then the market moved. Urals crude traded around $100 a barrel in late April, KSE says, and the US waived sanctions on Russian seaborne oil from mid-March to mid-June. Export earnings reached $19.1 billion in March. The budget gained about 0.8 trillion rubles net in the second quarter, yet the first-half deficit still hit 2.7 percent of GDP, 51 percent above plan.
One measure, two verdicts. Sanctions look decisive from January to March and irrelevant from April to June, and no source can say how much of either swing belongs to the measure itself.
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The war sends its own invoice
Laura Solanko, senior adviser at the Bank of Finland, notes that Russian defence and security spending rose from 3.6 percent of GDP in 2021 to 7.2 percent in the 2025 budget. BOFIT, the bank’s institute for emerging economies, puts war-related spending at about 20 percent of all government spending.
It adds that government spending grew by an average of 15 percent a year between 2022 and 2026. Its verdict on growth: “War-related sectors have expanded rapidly, whereas growth in the broader economy has remained weak.”
The 2026 budget plans defence at about a third of all spending. In the first quarter it took roughly 65 percent of federal revenue, by the analyst Janis Kluge’s calculation. Officials from the finance ministry and the central bank warned Putin in early June that the deficit could reach alarming levels, and they suggested cutting defence.
Ukraine’s drones add a second war cost. KSE finds that at the peak about 40 percent of Russian refining capacity was disrupted, and it ties the widening discount on Russian crude mainly to those strikes. A fuel shortage and a bigger discount are results of the war, and they land in the budget lines that sanctions advocates point to.
Oil and the rouble do the rest
Urals fell from about $100 in late April to $43.2 on 1 July, KSE says. Oil and gas revenue in the first half was 23 percent lower than a year earlier. The rouble averaged 76.3 to the dollar against 92.2 assumed in the budget, which shrinks what a barrel yields at home.
The headline hides some resilience. In the first quarter, revenue outside oil and gas rose about 7 percent to $88.5 billion, out of $107.2 billion in total. The budget still bled, though: the deficit for January to April alone reached about $79 billion, more than the whole of 2025.
On 24 July the Bank of Russia cut its 2026 growth forecast to a range of 0 to 1 percent and trimmed its key rate from 14.25 to 14 percent. Analysts link the cut to inflation, sanctions and falling energy revenues, again with no split between them.
The best case for sanctions
Defenders have hard numbers. Before the invasion Urals sold $1 to $2 below Brent. In 2024 and 2025 the gap was about $14, and after the late-2025 sanctions it passed $20, in Solanko’s account. BOFIT puts the average over the past year at around $20 and assumes it persists. That is a price Russia pays, and she ties it to sanctions.
Part of the damage hides from any oil chart. Solanko finds that few, if any, Russian industries have managed to replace imports, and that consumers face higher transport costs and weaker substitutes. The SITE authors add that Russia pays large markups for restricted goods such as semiconductors, because evasion runs through intermediaries.
Economists from SITE, KSE, CREA and other institutes put Russia’s loss from the price cap and the import embargo alone at several percent of GDP. Their March 2024 brief shows exports down 28 percent from 2022 to 2023 and about $300 billion of central bank reserves frozen. The authors themselves flag 2022 as an unusually high baseline.
The UK Foreign Office goes furthest. It estimates that sanctions deprived the Russian state of at least $450 billion between February 2022 and June 2025. Of that, $154 billion is lost oil tax revenue and about $285 billion is immobilised central bank reserves, a frozen stock rather than a yearly loss.
The same Foreign Office page admits that isolating the effect of sanctions from other global market dynamics is difficult. Even the most ambitious number comes with that warning attached.
In 2015 the IMF at least tried
When oil collapsed and the Crimea sanctions arrived together, the IMF faced the same knot and called the two very hard to disentangle. It still published numbers. Sanctions and counter-sanctions might initially have cut real GDP by 1 to 1½ percent, and the cumulative loss could reach 9 percent over the medium term, with the caveat of significant model uncertainty.
That is the standard I want applied now. An imperfect estimate with an open method can be attacked and improved. A confident claim without one can only be repeated.
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Why the split decides what Europe does next
If the discount is where sanctions bite, enforcement is the lever: the price cap and the shadow fleet, which the SITE brief names as gaps. If war spending does most of the harm, the weight falls on what Ukraine receives. If the oil price dominates, one of the cheapest sanctions may be burning less oil, which the SITE authors also list.
Without a split, the 21st package and the 22nd can both be called a triumph or a failure, whatever happens to the rouble. Nobody can lose that argument, so nobody can win it either.
A method exists to be copied. Solanko calculates that an average Urals price below $40 would widen the Russian deficit by roughly 1.5 percent of GDP. Run the same arithmetic with and without the $20 discount, with and without the Rosneft and Lukoil measures, and with refinery capacity at its pre-strike level, and you have three bars on one chart.
The bars will overlap, because the effects interact, so the honest output is a range. The Commission will answer that such a number would be uncertain. So was the IMF’s, and the IMF published it.
What I want from Brussels before the next package
The 21st package, adopted on 23 July, carried 216 asset-freeze listings, the most in a single package since 2022. On 3 October Ukraine’s sanctions representative Vladislav Vlasyuk said the 22nd package is more likely to come in November than October, and that about 1,600 more names were expected on the EU list in October.
Before the Council votes on that package, the European Commission should publish an estimate that splits Russia’s losses between sanctions, the war and the oil price, with the method open for anyone to attack. The SITE authors call the cost to sanctioning countries manageable. A manageable cost still deserves a number on the other side of the ledger.
Sanctions may well be working. Nobody who says so has shown me the figure.
Opinion pieces on ExtraFokus.eu reflect the views of their authors.
Sources
- BOFIT: Forecast for Russia 2026–2028 (5 Oct 2026) – growth, inflation, key rate, investment, war spending, discount on Russian crude.
- KSE Institute: Sanctions and the Russian Economy, 2026 Mid-Year Assessment (4 Aug 2026) – budget, oil revenue, Urals prices, refinery strikes, sanctions waiver.
- KSE Institute: Weak revenues put severe strain on the budget (5 Mar 2026) – early-2026 revenue and inflation data.
- Bank of Finland Bulletin: Rough times for the Russian economy (Laura Solanko, 2026) – war spending as share of GDP, Urals discount before and after the invasion.
- UK FCDO: Estimating the impact of sanctions on Russia’s war efforts (13 Jun 2025) – the $450 billion estimate, its components and stated limits.
- SITE, KSE, CREA and others: Sanctions on Russia, getting the facts right (18 Mar 2024) – price cap and embargo losses, export and reserve figures.
- IMF Survey: Cheaper oil and sanctions weigh on Russia’s growth outlook (3 Aug 2015) – 1 to 1½ percent initial and 9 percent medium-term estimates, with caveats.
- Jamestown Foundation: Central bank and finance ministry warn Putin of war’s impact on economy (2026) – first-quarter 2026 oil and gas revenue and the causes officials cited.
- Steptoe: EU Council adopts 21st sanctions package against Russia (23 Jul 2026) – adoption date and number of listings.
- UA News: EU may adopt 22nd sanctions package in November (3 Oct 2026) – Vlasyuk on timing and listings.

















